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Digital Originality
Edward Lee*
[The creative act] is an act of liberation—the defeat of habit by originality.1

ABSTRACT
This Article examines the doctrine of originality in U.S.
copyright law and proposes a reconfigured, three-part test that can
better analyze issues of first impression involving works created with
new digital technologies. The proposed test, encapsulated by the
concept of digital originality, provides much needed guidance to courts
to address the increasing complexities of digital creations in the
twenty-first century.
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Originality is the most fundamental requirement of U.S.
copyright law. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Copyright
Clause requires originality as a basic prerequisite to the grant of
copyright for every work, meaning: (1) the work must be
independently created with (2) a modicum of creativity.2 However, the
precise contours of these requirements remain obscure.
Like
obscenity, originality is a doctrine perhaps best described by the
(non)principle of “I know it when I see it,”3 meaning judges are left
considerable discretion to decide the issue. Fortunately, in the more
than twenty years following Feist, the lack of clarity in the doctrine of
originality has not posed a serious problem. Because the threshold for
originality is so low, most works easily pass the test, thereby obviating
the need for courts to explain the doctrine in depth.4
This happy doctrinal détente is now under siege. Increasingly,
creations from new digital technologies raise confounding questions of
originality, making problematic the notions of both “independent
2.
3.
4.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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creation” and a “modicum of creativity.”5 Put simply, copyright law’s
traditional notions of authorship are strained when machines do
much, if not all, of the creating.6 For example, three-dimensional (3D)
printers can make virtually any object, such as a sculpture, in three
dimensions.7 A human must create (though in some cases can just
copy) the design of the object, but the printer does the rest. As Chris
Anderson of Wired put it, “If you can draw it, we can make it.”8 Are
the 3D objects created by these printers original expression? If so,
who owns the copyright—the printer manufacturer, the user, or
someone else?
Consider also the popular iPhone 4S, with its
artificially intelligent personal assistant named Siri, who answers,
both by text and by voice, any question an iPhone user asks.9 Are
Siri’s conversations copyrightable?
If so, who owns the
copyright—Apple, the user, or perhaps Siri itself? Ask Siri and it is
resigned to answer: “I don’t understand.”10
Courts have yet to grapple with these perplexing questions.
Yet one court of appeals’s decision, Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales U.S.A., Inc.,11 presages the difficulty of these questions. In
Meshwerks, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled
controversially that a wire-frame digital model of a Toyota car, created
by humans with the aid of computers, lacked originality, despite the
human expertise and skill needed to create the model in a realistic
manner and with a 3D appearance.12 If courts apply the Tenth
Circuit’s approach to other digital creations, such as works from 3D
printers, copyright law may deny protection to many digital works for
lack of originality. Although this result might be defensible, the
reasoning must be more carefully thought out before courts begin to
deny copyrights to a whole class of works.
This Article begins that undertaking. Part I examines the
doctrine of originality and the challenges posed by digital technologies.
It dissects the Meshwerks case and its confused reasoning. Part II
proposes a more fully articulated test of originality—under the
5.
See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
7.
See Print Me a Stradivarius: How a New Manufacturing Technology Will Change
the World, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18114327; Roger Yu, More
Design Hobbyists, Entrepreneurs Use 3D Printing, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.
usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-02-20/3D-printing/53179186/1.
8.
See FORA.tv, 3D Printing: If You Can Draw It, You Can Make It, YOUTUBE (June
23, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XeLtaqF4ws.
9.
See iPhone 4S—Ask Siri to help you get things done, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
iphone/features/siri.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
10.
Siri, Are Your Answers Copyrightable?, SIRI FOR IPHONE 4S (on file with author).
11.
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
12.
Id. at 1266.
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doctrine of “digital originality”—to deal with the controversies raised
by digital technologies in cases involving novel or difficult issues of
law regarding originality. The proposed test reconfigures the test of
originality from a two-part to a three-part test, and then more fully
delineates each part. Part II also discusses studies related to the
artistic process that add greater insight to understanding originality,
especially regarding realistic depictions of objects in the world. To
demonstrate how the revised test operates, Part II applies it to the
digital models in Meshwerks, 3D printed objects, and Siri’s answers.
Under the proposed test, Meshwerks would come out differently—the
digital models of the Toyota car should satisfy originality. Part III
addresses concerns.
I. ORIGINALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
This Part explains the doctrine of originality and examines how
digital technologies raise difficult issues for the doctrine—presenting
more substantial challenges than experienced in the past. As digital
creations become more automated and the process of creation and
relationships among actors become more fluid, notions of originality
will become more strained.
A. Originality
Originality is the most important requirement for obtaining a
copyright.
Although the basic contours of the doctrine are
straightforward, some commentators have recently expressed
dissatisfaction with the doctrine.13
Before delving into the
complexities that digital creations pose, the following section provides
a brief refresher on the basics of the doctrine.
1. Feist Test
In 1991, in the landmark Feist decision, the Supreme Court
clarified the doctrine of originality and its status as a constitutional
requirement of the Copyright Clause.14
To some copyright
commentators, the Court’s constitutional ruling was a surprise.15 But

13.
See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
14.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-48 (1991).
15.
See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1 (3d
ed. Supp. 2012) (casting doubt on the precedential support for orginality’s status as a
constitutional requirement).
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other commentators shared the view adopted by the Feist Court.16
Indeed, the Court drew from, of all places, Nimmer on Copyright to
articulate the following constitutional test of originality: “Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity.”17
Since the decision, over 550 lower court decisions have
discussed or applied the Feist test of originality.18
Yet most
copyrighted works have no difficulty satisfying the low threshold of
originality. As the Feist Court stated, “[t]he vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily.”19 Even in the few areas that have
presented more litigated issues of originality, such as compilations,
derivative works, maps, and photographs, courts have not had much
difficulty applying the test of originality.20

16.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719,
763 n.155 (1989)).
17.
Id. at 345 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01(A)-(B) (1990)). Of course, the Supreme Court can articulate a constitutional principle
based on any source it fancies, but one might expect the Court to rely directly on its own
precedents for constitutional law rather than on secondary sources such as a treatise.
18.
Feist /p Originality, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (follow “Search” hyperlink
and select “Terms & Connectors” hyperlink; then select “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases” and “U.S.
District Court Cases” hyperlinks; then enter “Feist /p originality” in the “Search” hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 1, 2012).
19.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
20.
See, e.g., Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d
417, 430 (4th Cir. 2010) (“For compilations of preexisting elements, ‘the principal focus should be
on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit
protection.’” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 358)); Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“Additions to the preexisting maps such as color, shading, and labels using standard fonts and
shapes fall within the narrow category of works that lack even a minimum level of
creativity . . . .”); see also Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009)
(discussing a liberal standard of originality for photographs based on staging or rendition of the
scene, “except perhaps for a very limited class of photographs that can be characterized as
‘slavish copies’ of an underlying work”). Schrock also held that “(1) the originality requirement
for derivative works is not more demanding than the originality requirement for other works;
and (2) the key inquiry is whether there is sufficient nontrivial expressive variation in the
derivative work to make it distinguishable from the underlying work in some meaningful way.”
Schrock, 586 F.3d at 521.
ON
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2. Recent Debate among Scholars
The relative lack of controversy over the doctrine of originality
in cases has not stopped academics from raising several controversies
of their own. Some scholars believe that originality is too permissive
or indiscriminate in allowing works to qualify for copyright.21 For
example, Professor Joseph Miller argues that originality should
incorporate something akin to a nonobviousness requirement from
patent law, thereby imposing a much higher standard for works to
qualify for copyright.22 Miller proposes this new standard to decrease
the number of works eligible for copyright and thereby reduce the
extent to which copyright permeates people’s daily lives.23 Likewise,
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein contend that
copyright law should be changed to give greater or lesser protection
depending on whether the work has more or less originality.24 In their
view, which curiously lacks any empirical or anecdotal support, “the
current approach incentivizes production of too many works at the low
end of the originality spectrum and a suboptimal number of truly
original works.”25 Other scholars share Parchomovsky and Stein’s
criticisms of originality under current doctrine.26
By contrast, Professor Eva Subotnik suggests that the current
low threshold of originality is probably the best courts can do in
delineating the doctrine because “courts are ultimately doomed to fail
in the quest to explain, in a satisfying way, how a work of authorship
is original in and of itself.”27 According to Subotnik, “Caught between
the impermissibility of relying upon aesthetic virtues, on the one
hand, and the degree of effort expended by an author, on the other, the
closest courts can come to identifying originality, at least under the
current copyright framework, is through proxies for the legal
concept.”28
Although illuminating, the recent debate among scholars over
originality has yet to confront the more pressing problem the doctrine
21.
See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
22.
See Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 457-63
(2009).
23.
Id.
24.
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1507
(2009).
25.
Id. at 1506.
26.
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response, Tiered Originality and the Dualism of
Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 67 (2009) (“Parchomovsky and Stein are indeed
correct to lament the meaninglessness of originality under current copyright doctrine.”).
27.
Eva E. Subotnik, Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1487, 1494 (2011).
28.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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faces: its application to digital creations. Digital creations will
increasingly test copyright’s understanding of originality in ways not
encountered before.
B. Digital Creations
The Meshwerks case, decided in 2008, previewed the challenges
that digital creations present.29 As the Section below explains, the
Tenth Circuit’s analysis is questionable on several fronts.30
1. Meshwerks
Meshwerks is a “3D Digital Content Creation Studio using
state of the art technology to provide highly creative 3[D] solutions for
film, commercial, broadcast television and game companies.”31 In
2003, Toyota hired Meshwerks to help create digital models of Toyota
cars for use by an ad agency working for Toyota.32 The digital models
provided better substitutes for photographs because users can adjust
the models—such as in color, background, styling—by computer,
thereby replacing the need to retake photos for such changes in the
future.33
Meshwerks was responsible for creating 3D digital wire frames
of the Toyota cars; the wire frames look like a skeletal or lattice
framework depicting the cars.34 One of Meshwerks’s wire-frame
models (submitted to the court) is reproduced below in Figure 1:

29.
See generally Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258
(10th Cir. 2008).
30.
Meshwerks has generated considerable criticism already. See, e.g., Andrew C.
Landsman, Comment, Fender Bender: 3D Computer Modeling of Commercial Objects and the
Meshwerks v. Toyota Decision, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 429, 430 (2009); Michael
Palumbo, Note, Copyright Protection for the Fruits of Digital Labor: Finding Originality in
Digital Wire-Frames, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (2009); see also Dennis S. Karjala,
Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 184-85 (2008) (arguing that the better
approach would have been to allow copyright, but “the scope of protection should be narrowed to
the point that only slavish copying—through the modern equivalents of photocopying, like the
use of molds for three-dimensional works—is held to infringe”).
31.
About Us, MESHWERKS, http://www.meshwerks.com (follow “About Us” hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
32.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
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Figure 1. Meshwerks’s wire-frame depiction35

The user or viewer could presumably rotate the wire-frame
model of the car to different angles on the computer.36
Meshwerks’s process for creating the wire frames involved
three steps. First, in the measurement stage, “Meshwerks took
copious measurements of Toyota’s vehicles by covering each car, truck,
and van with a grid of tape and running an articulated arm tethered
to a computer over the vehicle to measure all points of intersection in
the grid.”37 Second, in the mapping stage, “the vehicles’ data points
(measurements) were mapped onto a computerized grid and the
modeling software connected the dots to create a ‘wire frame’ of each
vehicle.”38 Third, in the sculpting stage, Meshwerks employees had to
fine-tune or “sculpt” the wire-frame models manually on the computer
because the computer-generated model of the car after the second
stage was relatively crude.39
In the sculpting phase, the amount of human input by
Meshwerks’s employees in creating the digital model of the car was
extensive:
Approximately 90 percent of the data points contained in each final model, Meshwerks
represents, were the result . . . of the skill and effort its digital sculptors manually
expended at the [sculpting] step. For example, some areas of detail, such as wheels,
headlights, door handles, and the Toyota emblem, could not be accurately measured
using current technology; those features had to be added at the . . . “sculpting” stage,
and Meshwerks had to recreate those features as realistically as possible by hand, based
on photographs. Even for areas that were measured, Meshwerks faced the challenge of
converting measurements taken of a three-dimensional car into a two-dimensional
computer representation; to achieve this, its modelers had to sculpt, or move, data points
to achieve a visually convincing result. The purpose and product of these processes,
after nearly 80 to 100 hours of effort per vehicle, were two-dimensional wire-frame

35.
Id. at 1271 app. A.
36.
Id. at 1265 (stating that the wire-frame car lacked a choice on “the angle at which to
pose it”).
37.
Id. at 1260.
38.
Id. The court grouped the mapping and measurement stages together. See id. For
clarity, this Article distinguishes the two.
39.
Id. at 1261.
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depictions of Toyota’s vehicles that appeared three-dimensional on screen, but were
utterly unadorned—lacking color, shading, and other details.40

The legal dispute in Meshwerks arose over the terms of the
license for the Meshwerks wire-frame model.41
According to
Meshwerks, the license allowed Toyota only a single commercial use of
the wire-frame model, but Toyota used the model in subsequent
advertisements.42 After registering with the Copyright Office the
copyright for its wire-frame model of the Toyota car, Meshwerks sued
Toyota and Toyota’s ad agency for copyright infringement.43 As a
defense, Toyota argued that Meshwerks’s wire-frame models “lacked
sufficient originality to be protected by copyright” because “any
original expression found in Meshwerks’ products was attributable to
the Toyota designers who conceived of the vehicle designs.”44
The trial court agreed with Toyota and held “that the
wire-frame models were merely copies of Toyota’s products, not
sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.”45 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that “Meshwerks’ models are not
so much independent creations as (very good) copies of Toyota’s
vehicles.”46 Therefore, viewed as merely copies, Meshwerks’s wire
frames flunked the test of originality.47
The appellate court’s decision is not a model of clarity. At the
outset, the court noted its difficulty with the issue presented: “how
might that doctrine apply in an age of virtual worlds and digital media
that seek to mimic the ‘real’ world, but often do so in ways that
undoubtedly qualify as (highly) original?”48 Although the court
identified the right question, its opinion ambled between (1)
originality cases involving photographs49 and (2) originality cases
involving factual compilations.50 The court’s conflation of these cases
is apparent in the court’s string citation of cases that the court
believed stood for the principle that copyright does not extend to
“copies of facts in the world, as well as copies of prior works of art.”51
This error infected the court’s holding: “[W]e hold . . . that, standing

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1260-61 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1264.
Id.
Id. at 1263.
See id. at 1263-66.
See id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1267.
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alone, ‘[t]he fact that a work in one medium has been copied from a
work in another medium does not render it any the less a ‘copy.’”52
Lost in the sea of the court’s string citation is the fact that the
Toyota car is not a work of expression. It is a car—an uncopyrightable
useful article.53 That key factual distinction renders irrelevant nearly
all of the cases and authorities cited by the Tenth Circuit to support
its holding.54 The Feist Court explicitly stated that “independently
create[]” meant not “copied from other works.”55 In Meshwerks, the
Toyota cars are not works of expression—they are useful articles,
devices whose designs are inseparable from the functions they serve.
Therefore, depicting those useful objects in one’s own drawing or
representation is not “copying” in the Feist sense. Most courts that
have addressed the issue recognize originality in realistic depictions of
uncopyrightable things in the world,56 although two district courts
52.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.01(B) (2009)).
53.
A useful article is not copyrightable unless it has a design that “incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)
(defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). Applying this test, the Toyota car design
would most likely fail. Under the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s “design process”
test, the court examines what the designer in fact did. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac.
Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1987). If the designer was “significantly influenced
by functional considerations” in choosing the design elements, those elements will not be
separable or copyrightable. Id. It is hard to imagine that Toyota’s designers were not
significantly influenced by functional considerations in designing the car at issue. The Toyota car
looks like a basic sedan, without any artistic embellishments. Under the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit’s approach, a court may also consider whether “the design creates in the
mind of an ordinary observer two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained
simultaneously.” Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 926 (7th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
dissenting)). Under this test, the Toyota car likely fails as well—the features of the Toyota car
are arguably impossible to separate from their function to make the car run and perform well as
a vehicle. When one looks at the Toyota car, it appears as nothing more than a vehicle for
transportation. But cf. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d
1235, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1991) (some design features of Ferrari cars were not functional under
trademark law and chosen for their distinctiveness and beauty, not utility).
54.
The cases involving copying other works relied on by the Tenth Circuit are
inapposite. See ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (no originality in sketches of transmissions parts “copied from
photographs cut out of competitors’ catalogs”) (emphasis added); Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v.
Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (copying characters for 3D
costumes); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (copying Disney
characters in plastic); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (no originality in slavish photographic copies of public domain paintings lacking
any distinguishable variation).
55.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (emphasis
added).
56.
See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding originality in some
features of realistic sculpture of a jellyfish); Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d
1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding originality in realistic depiction of animal in stuffed toy
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have had some confusion in the case law regarding photographs.57 Put
simply, realism is not contrary to originality.
Besides Meshwerks, no published decision has ever held that a
person’s own realistic sketch or rendering of an uncopyrightable thing
is a mere “copy” of the object that fails the “independently create”
requirement of Feist.58 The only arguably relevant case authority the
Tenth Circuit cited involved a simple site map that used stock
features, which the case found lacked originality.59 There was no
suggestion in Meshwerks that the digital models of the car were
simple stock features.
Ultimately, the court’s holding that Meshwerks’s digital models
were mere copies cannot withstand scrutiny. If the court’s analysis
were correct, then every realistic pencil sketch of objects in the world,
such as the kind Leonardo da Vinci was famous for,60 could never
animal); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1959)
(finding originality in realistic photographs of cakes); Cannon Grp., Inc. v. Better Bags, Inc., 250
F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (finding originality in realistic drawing of ears of corn); E.
Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding
originality in photographs of electrical products); Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg.
Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding originality in stuffed toy lambs and
bunnies); R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding originality in stuffed toy fish, frogs, and monkeys).
57.
See Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 542,
549 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (finding no originality in photographs of motorcycle taillights where the
“photographs were meant to serve the purely utilitarian purpose of displaying examples of its
product to potential consumers, and do not merit copyright protection”); Oriental Art Printing,
Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding no originality
in photographs of Chinese food dishes to sell the food to customers). In determining originality,
these cases appear to place great weight on the purpose of the photographs to sell the items they
depict. The Feist test, however, does not hinge on the commercial or advertising purpose of a
work. See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting
that “[t]he purpose of the photographs . . . is irrelevant” for originality purposes).
58.
In an unpublished decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did find
a drawing of a spindle bearing failed originality for lack of creativity, because it was a realistic
depiction that was common in mail-order catalogs in the industry. See J. Thomas Distribs., Inc.
v. Greenline Distribs., Inc., No. 95-2100, 1996 WL 636138, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1996). This
decision seems to be wrongly decided, although this author has not reviewed the drawing itself.
The proper analysis probably would recognize a thin copyright in the drawing of a spindle that
would allow others to draw a spindle as well. Also, some elements of different objects may be
uncopyrightable if they are stock elements that must be included in standard depictions of the
objects. Courts have dealt with this issue under the idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire
doctrine. See, e.g., Satava, 323 F.3d at 810-12. These doctrines are different from originality and
when applied, often result in a “thin” copyright granted to depictions of such objects with stock
elements as long as there is some minimal level of creativity. Id. Such a ruling is much different
from Meshwerks, which denied copyright to the digital model of the car altogether. Meshwerks,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008).
59.
Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding site plan using standard cartographic features lacked originality in the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of facts).
60.
See Albert M. Rosenblatt, The Interaction of Law and Psychiatry: A Voyage Over the
Ages, 69 ALB. L. REV. 969, 979 (2006) (“Leonardo da Vinci could study the bodies of both the
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qualify for a copyright because they would be “mere copies of facts.”
That reasoning is contrary to Feist, which dealt with compilations of
facts (i.e., names and phone numbers) embodied in simple text, not a
person’s visual representation of uncopyrightable objects in the
world.61 To consider the two to be one and the same is erroneous.
Raw facts are not copyrightable, whereas depictions of the world are.62
Also dubious is the Tenth Circuit’s elevation and application of
photography cases to define the litmus test for originality in digital
models.63 Based on this analogy, the court reduced the possibilities of
satisfying originality for digital models to cases where the creator
made “decisions regarding lighting, shading, the background in front
of which a vehicle would be posed, the angle at which to pose it, or the
like.”64 Those are some of the typical bases in which courts deem
photographs of objects to be original.65 Under prevailing doctrine,
virtually all photographs pass the test because a photograph always
captures some personality of the taker.66 Curiously, though, in the
case of Meshwerks’s wire-frame models, the court held that they
depicted only “unadorned vehicles” absent “lighting, angle,
perspective, and ‘other ingredients’ associated with an original
expression.”67
There are two major flaws with the court’s analysis. First, the
court provided no justification for equating digital modeling entirely
with photography.68 Although the two may share some similarity in
the end products produced—a digital model may yield something akin
to a photograph that a user can manipulate—the processes involved in
photography and digital modeling are vastly different. As explained
living and the dead and draw anatomical sketches so accurate that they were used by physicians
for centuries.”); Boyce Rensberger, The Art of Science; Eyes of Illustrators Help Scientists to See,
WASH. POST, July 10, 1996, at H1 (describing creativity involved in “rendering
three-dimensionality on a two-dimensional surface” in scientific illustrations).
61.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991).
62.
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text. The following example illustrates this basic distinction: A listing of a
person’s name and address is an uncopyrightable fact, but a visual depiction of that person’s
house and residence would be potentially copyrightable. The former is a bare, textual description
of a fact, while the latter is a person’s particular visual interpretation and rendition of a fact.
63.
See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265.
64.
Id.
65.
Cf. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(discussing possible originality in photographs by rendition, timing, and choice of subject
matter).
66.
See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. (Skyy I), 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.
2000); Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(“[N]o photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the
author . . . .”).
67.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266.
68.
See generally id.
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above, digital modeling of wire frames involves extensive measuring,
computer modeling, and then human sculpting of data points that may
require considerable human input, skill, and judgment to render an
image that is realistic enough to appear three dimensional, even
though represented in two dimensions.69 As artists have confirmed,
this artistic effect—depicting the two dimensional to appear three
dimensional—requires considerable creativity and human thought.70
Taking photographs involves none of these steps or human choices,
however.
A camera’s representation of an object is far more
mechanical in this respect. One can merely point and shoot.
By comparison, the critical “sculpting” stage involved in
Meshwerks’s models is more akin to drawing or sculpting a figure
than photographing it.71 Just as in drawing or sculpting (but not in
photography), Meshwerks’s digital modeling depended primarily on
human skill and conception, not mechanical reproduction, to render a
realistic expression of the object.72
Second, even if the court uses photography cases as the test of
originality for digital models, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is
unconvincing. As noted earlier, the prevailing approach is that
virtually any photograph—even from an automatic, point-and-shoot
camera—satisfies the originality requirement, on the theory that
every photograph captures some aspect of the personality of the
person taking the photograph.73 The sole case cited by Meshwerks in
which the court found certain photographs lacked originality involved
photographs of other works, not uncopyrightable objects.74
Also dubious is the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that Meshwerks
made no decision regarding lighting, shading, the background, or
angle at which the wire-frame car was posed.75 Drawing a skeletal,
3D wire-frame representation of a car that can be rotated to different
angles, represents a choice regarding at least shading, background,
69.
Id. at 1267-68.
70.
See Gregory P. Garvey, Life Drawing and 3D Figure Modeling with MAYA:
Developing Alternatives to Photo-Realistic Modeling, 35 LEONARDO 303, 304-05 (2002) (“Creating
convincing characters with believable movement requires much more than anatomical
correctness. . . . A mastery of drawing and understanding of anatomy and proportion lay the
groundwork for making believable corrections, enhancements or distortions to polygonal meshes
created from 3D scanning.”).
71.
See id. at 306 (making connection between traditional drawing and 3D modeling for
art workshop); Landsman, supra note 30, at 443; Palumbo, supra note 30, at 151.
72.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260-61.
73.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
74.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1267 (citing Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36
F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Wisely, the Tenth Circuit did not rely on two decisions of
suspect reasoning that focused on the advertising purpose of the photographs in finding no
originality. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
75.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265.
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and angle.76 The shading is a single color (such as grayscale), akin to
a pencil sketch.77 The creator uses lines for the wire frames with
see-through spaces in between.78 Likewise, the absence of a defined
background represents a choice about the background, much in the
same way photographers choose to have completely white or black
backgrounds for artistic effect.79 Moreover, the choice to allow the
wire-frame car to be turned to numerous angles represents a choice
about the various angles in which the car can be viewed and still
retain its apparent 3D appearance.80 None of these options—gray
lines, a blank background, or a changeable pose—is mandated by all
computer-aided design (CAD) software for every 3D representation.81
Just as a sketch artist can choose to go beyond a gray pencil color and
blank background, so too a digital artist can choose to go beyond a
gray wire frame, blank background, and changeable pose. That either
artist sticks with those aforementioned features in her rendition does
not somehow disqualify her selection from being a choice of how to
create the rendition.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis incorrectly based its
analysis of “independently create” on “(1) an objective assessment of
the particular models . . . and (2) the parties’ purpose in creating
76.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text; infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
77.
See, e.g., Set Color, Screening, Grayscale, and Dither in Plot Style Tables, AUTOCAD,
http://docs.autodesk.com/ACD/2010/ENU/AutoCAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.h
tml?url=WS1a9193826455f5ffa23ce210c4a30acaf-5f36.htm,topicNumber=d0e142240 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2012) (discussing choice of colors on AutoCAD software, including grayscale). This
author has used the options available on AutoCAD, a popular computer-aided design (CAD)
software, for illustrative purposes. Although Meshwerks used different types of CAD software, it
is reasonable to assume the CAD software had comparable, if not even more sophisticated,
options. See infra note 81.
78.
See, e.g., Create Wireframe Models, AUTOCAD, http://docs.autodesk.com/ACD/2010/
ENU/AutoCAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.html?url=WS1a9193826455f5ffa23ce
210c4a30acaf-67c8.htm,topicNumber=d0e100543 (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (discussing option
of creating wireframe models as one option in addition to using solids, meshes, and objects with
thickness).
79.
See, e.g., Display Backgrounds and Shadows, AUTOCAD, http://docs.autodesk.com/
ACD/2010/ENU/AutoCAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.html?url=WS1a919382645
5f5ffa23ce210c4a30acaf-67c8.htm,topicNumber=d0e100543 (follow “Control the Drawing Views”
hyperlink; then follow “Change Views” hyperlink; then follow “Shade a Model and Use Edge
Effects” hyperlink; then follow “Customize a Visual Style” hyperlink; then follow “Display
Backgrounds and Shadows” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (discussing option of adding
backgrounds and shadows).
80.
See, e.g., Rotate Objects, AUTOCAD, http://docs.autodesk.com/ACD/2010/ENU/Auto
CAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.html?url=WS1a9193826455f5ffa23ce210c4a30a
caf-6a6f.htm,topicNumber=d0e87272 (last visited Mar 23, 2012) (discussing option of rotating
object to specified or absolute angles).
81.
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. On its website, Meshwerks lists
several types of CAD software, such as Alias Maya and Inovmetric Polyworks, as a part of its
tools. See Toolbox, MESHWERKS, http://www.meshwerks.com (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then
follow “Toolbox” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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them.”82 As Part II explains, a proper analysis of “independently
create” should focus primarily on the subjective process by which the
copyright holder created the work, or, in other words, what the
copyright holder actually did—copy or not copy another’s work.83 Part
II outlines how courts should properly analyze the Meshwerks case.84
2. Complexities of Digital Creations
Meshwerks is only the tip of the iceberg. In the future, courts
will face even more difficult cases of originality involving digital
creations. Although courts must wait for the new digital technologies
to develop in order to analyze them properly, this Article begins the
analysis by making educated predictions about some of the features of
digital technologies that will present problems for originality analysis.
a. Copying and Customization among the Masses
One characteristic of digital technologies is that they may offer
the masses a convenient tool to copy, but also to customize at the same
time. The copying feature will diminish one’s chance of satisfying
originality, while the customization feature will help one’s chance.
For example, if a person uses a 3D printer to make a toy car that he
copies from a public domain design, but adds some artistic elements to
the design, he has an arguable claim of authorship to the new part he
added.85 As new digital technologies, such as 3D printers, become
mass produced and marketed to consumers, it is more likely that the
average person will become a “creator” and implicate copyright with
their productions at home. If millions of people eventually own 3D
printers, the possible claims of authorship by ordinary people will
reach a level perhaps never experienced before.

82.
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir.
2008).
83.
See infra notes 101-07, 125-26 and accompanying text.
84.
See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
85.
A toy car design might be copyrightable because it is not a useful article (like a real
car). The design of the toy is “merely to portray the appearance of the article”—meaning an
actual car—and, therefore, is not considered a useful article. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining
“useful article”).
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b. Less Human Input and Artificial Intelligence
On the flip side, digital technologies may also reduce the level
of human input needed to create works. Computer programs can
generate works on their own, with very little human input.86
Artificially intelligent programs create works with no human input at
all. Imagine, for example, if Siri on the iPhone began creating all of
the expression in its answers on its own.
Sound fanciful?
Already-existing artificial intelligence (AI) programs essentially create
their own works of expression.87 Take, for example, Narrative Science,
a startup company that has developed a computer program that
analyzes facts and data, and then creates an article based on the
information.88 The articles produced are quite impressive—it is
virtually impossible to tell that a computer program, and not a human
author, created them.89 Similarly, for nearly forty years, a computer
program named AARON, developed by Harold Cohen, has been
creating visual works.90 Obviously, current notions of originality are
made problematic—if not thrown upside down—to the extent
computers take over the creative process and begin creating on their
own. With the development of AI, courts will face fundamental
questions of whether nonhumans can be “Authors” under the
Copyright Clause.91
c. Dynamic, Fluid, and Complex Relationships
Another feature of digital creations that may give courts
problems is the dynamic nature of some creations. Creations may
become more fluid and changeable over time.92 Consider, for example,

86.
See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
87.
See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
88.
See Rachel Arndt, This Article Was Not Written by a Computer, FAST COMPANY,
http://www.fastcoexist.com/1678779/this-article-was-not-written-by-a-computer (last visited Apr.
2, 2012); Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-aregaining-traction.html.
89.
See, e.g., Final: Wisconsin 51, UNLV 17, BIG TEN NETWORK (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://btn.com/2011/09/01/first-quarter-wisconsin-20-unlv-0; see also Lohr, supra note 88 (noting
previous Big Ten Network article was written by Narrative Science artificial intelligence).
90.
See Harold Cohen, The Further Exploits of AARON, Painter, 4 STAN. HUMAN. REV.
141 (1995), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/cohen.html.
91.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
92.
See, e.g., Roberta R. Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process
Theology for Authorship and Moral Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889 (2012) (disagreeing
with the Seventh Circuit’s decision that a living garden is not capable of copyright protection and
introducing a new way to analyze fluid works under copyright law); see also Kelley v. Chi. Park
Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (no copyright in “Wildflower Works” landscape art

2012]

DIGITAL ORIGINALITY

935

the new, state-of-the-art “light field” cameras.93 The “focusing” of the
picture occurs after it is shot.94 Any viewer of the photograph can
“refocus” the photo by pressing the photo on the computer screen.95
The person who took the photo does not control the focusing. Instead,
the viewer does. Updates to the software for the camera may add
different features to the photos already taken, such as making them
viewable in 3D or full focus.96 In the above scenario, does the viewer
have any claim of authorship by selecting the actual focus of the
photograph? What about the software developer who provided, at a
later time, enhanced features to view the photograph? If so, are the
photographer, viewer, and software developer all joint authors? These
are perplexing questions that will require a much deeper
understanding of the concept of originality.
II. PROPOSAL: DIGITAL ORIGINALITY
This Part proposes a more fully articulated test of originality
for cases involving digital creations.
The concept of “digital
originality” encapsulates this test. Whether the test should apply
universally to all creations under copyright law is left for future
analysis.
A. Moving to a Three-Part Test of Originality
Under the conventional account of Feist, courts determine
originality by a two-part test: the work in question must be
(1) independently created, and (2) possess at least a modicum of
creativity.97
Although this two-part test has worked well
because “a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable fixation normally required to
support copyright”).
93.
See Harry McCracken, Lytro: What Really Makes It Revolutionary, CNET NEWS
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-33200_3-20123224-290/lytro-what-really-makes-itrevolutionary.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
See Robert Scoble, My First Photowalk with Lytro’s Lightfield Camera, SCOBLEIZER
(Dec. 28, 2011), http://scobleizer.com/2011/12/28/lytro_first_use (video discussion at 9:58 minutes
and following).
97.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To be original, an
element must both be an independent creation of its author and involve at least minimal
creativity.”); NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontintentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 113-14 & n.4 (2d
Cir. 2007) (“Originality is a constitutional requisite and requires that the ‘work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.’” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 345)); see also 2
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:31 (2012) (discussing two requirements of
independent creation and creativity); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 24, at 1507; Subotnik,

936

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:4:919

enough—even without full explication—in the twenty years following
Feist, it will face greater strain with the growth of digital creations
that raise more confounding questions of originality. Because the
two-part test conflates several different concerns, it is likely to create
confusion among the courts as they face more difficult cases.
Accordingly, to deal with these difficult cases, the courts need to have
a better understanding of originality and its constituent parts.
To that end, this Article proposes that originality is better
understood as a three-part test: the work must be (1) independently
(2) created, and (3) possess at least a modicum of creativity. Under
this framework, each part of the test does slightly different work, as
summarized in the chart (Figure 2) below and discussed afterwards.
Courts should use the three-part test in cases involving digital
creations that raise issues of first impression or more complex issues
of law than previously faced.98
Figure 2. The Three-Part Test of Originality

Independently
Process
Not “copied from
other works”
= subjective

Create
Process + product
1. originate
- “intellectual
production, thought,
conception”
= subjective
2. format: a “work”

Modicum of
Creativity
Product
some “creative
spark”
- can be crude, humble,
obvious, not novel
- but not so mechanical
or routine to be
expected as a matter of
course
- Bleistein proviso

= objective

= objective

1. Independently: Not Copied from Other Works
The first part of the reconfigured test of originality requires
that a work be independently made by the author “as opposed to
copied from other works.”99 Under the conventional account of
originality, courts discuss this component as the requirement of
“independently create,” or independent creation.100 The grammatical
supra note 27, at 1490. The Tenth Circuit applied this standard two-part formulation of Feist in
Meshwerks. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.
2008).
98.
As explained in Part III, whether the test should apply to all cases under copyright
law is left for future inquiry. For now, the test is limited to those difficult cases involving digital
creations that raise a novel or more complex question of law.
99.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
100.
Id.
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usage of the adverb “independence” would suggest that consideration
of both “independently” and “create” together makes logical sense.
However, the pairing of the two concepts has obscured the meaning
each respectively contributes to the notion of independent creation.
To emphasize those individual contributions, this Article proposes
bifurcating the two terms.
The “independent” requirement means that, as the Supreme
Court explained in Feist, one cannot simply copy another person’s
work if one hopes to qualify for a copyright.101 A mere copy of someone
else’s work is entirely dependent on the original work for its content.
For example, if one prints a copy of Shakespeare’s plays from the
Internet, she has not “independently” made the content in the plays.
Shakespeare did.
This notion of “independent” work is similar to trade secret
law’s concept of independent discovery of a trade secret.
An
independent discovery of a trade secret, which is categorically
permissible without the permission of the trade secret owner, means
the third party did not copy the trade secret.102 Instead, the third
party discovered the know-how on her own. Thus, in both copyright
and trade secret law, copying is the antithesis of independently
making.103
Contrary to the analysis in Meshwerks,104 the independence
requirement focuses on the process of what the person in fact did
instead of the end product.105 This part of the test is subjective in
order to highlight that the process of how the creator came up with the
work is key. Comparing the work with a similar work—indeed, even
exactly the same work—cannot answer whether the work in question
was independently made. Although exactly identical works might
suggest copying has occurred, Judge Learned Hand’s famous example
of two poets independently creating the same poem, cited favorably by

101.
Id.
102.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (“While trade secret
law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent
creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of the
invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time.” (emphasis added)).
103.
Of course, authors routinely “stand on the shoulders” of those who come before; the
ideal of the romantic author who creates in isolation is largely a myth. See Madhavi Sunder,
Bollywood/Hollywood, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 275, 285-92 (2011) (discussing Disney films
based on earlier works).
104.
See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th
Cir. 2008) (making an “objective assessment of the particular models before us”).
105.
A somewhat analogous approach is used by courts to determine whether artistic
elements are separable from useful articles. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co.,
834 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting “design process” test and examining “whether
the aesthetic design elements [we]re significantly influenced by functional considerations”).
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the Supreme Court in Feist, underscores the subjective nature of the
independence requirement.106 As long as the two poets are ignorant of
each other’s works, both of their identical creations are independently
made.107
One way of thinking about the independence requirement is as
a surrogate for copyright infringement. If one merely copies another’s
work, the copier is not entitled to a copyright. Instead, the copier is an
infringer.108 Conversely, if one independently creates the same work
as someone else’s, the independent creator has a defense to
infringement.109 This distinction helps to explain why the two poets
who create identical works both get copyrights for their works, while
the copier who makes the same identical work does not.
Also important to recall is that the independence requirement
does not prohibit all copying. It prohibits only copying “from other
works”110—i.e., what would constitute copyright infringement.111
Copying other works involved in infringement is different from
“copying” to depict realistically certain uncopyrightable things in the
world. For example, an art student who realistically draws a
mountain, machine, or motorcycle has independently made the
drawing, even though the artist strives to depict the mountain,
machine, or motorcycle in a way that is identical to the real thing.
The realistic depiction does not involve copying for the purposes of the
originality requirement of independence. As Justice Holmes explained
in his famous opinion in Bleistein:
It is obvious also that the plaintiff’s case is not affected by the fact, if it be one, that the
pictures represent actual groups,—visible things. . . . But even if they had been drawn
from the life, that fact would not deprive them of protection. The opposite proposition
would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or Whistler was common property because
others might try their hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the original. They
are not free to copy the copy. The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even
in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is
one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the
words of the act.112

106.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (citing Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)).
107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 361.
109.
See PATRY, supra note 97, § 3:30 (discussing “defensive” independent creation).
110.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
111.
Copying from a work in the public domain (meaning not protected by copyright)
raises a special problem that is discussed in the context of 3D printing. See infra notes 166-71
and accompanying text.
112.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
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In other words, according to Holmes, people are free to depict
realistically, or “copy,” “the original” object (e.g., a face) in the world.
But people are not free to “copy the copy”; they cannot copy someone
else’s copyrighted work depicting the same object. This principle
explains why it is unlawful to sell copies of another’s copyrighted map,
but perfectly lawful to make a map independently with the exact same
facts.113 Indeed, even the photography case on which the Meshwerks
court relied (Skyy I) recognized this basic distinction between copying
a work and depicting an uncopyrightable item.114
The wisdom of Justice Holmes’s admonition in Bleistein is
widely recognized today. As Judge Posner explained:
If a painter paints from life, no court is going to hold that his painting is not
copyrightable because it is an exact photographic likeness. If that were the rule
photographs could not be copyrighted—the photographs of Judy Garland in ‘The Wizard
of Oz,’ for example—but of course they can be.115

Recent studies of realistic art depictions substantiate the
soundness of this approach and Justice Holmes’s dictum.116 Being
able to draw or depict an object in realistic fashion requires artistic
skill that an artist can develop, but the process of depiction is, in
itself, highly subjective to the artist. In one study, neuroscientist R.C.
Miall and filmmaker John Tchalenko examined the eye and hand
movements of trained and untrained artists sketching a face.117 Using
an “eyetracker” device, the study showed a marked difference in the
eye movements between trained and untrained artists.118 The trained
artist focused steadily for a longer period on the model’s face while
drawing but, in between drawing, the artist “would look at his
drawing with shorter, more rapid fixations or, alternatively, with
smooth movements that followed the pencil tip across the paper.”119
By contrast, the untrained artist “did not show clear changes in eye
113.
See Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 149
(7th Cir. 1985).
114.
See Skyy I, 225 F.3d 1068, 1081 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because Ets–Hokin’s product shots
are shots of the bottle as a whole—a useful article not subject to copyright protection—and not
shots merely, or even mainly, of its label, we hold that the bottle does not qualify as a
‘preexisting work’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act. As such, the photos Ets–Hokin took
of the bottle cannot be derivative works.”); see also Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224,
1234-35 (11th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that a photograph of customized motorcycles would not
create a derivative work because “Latimer’s photographs can best be described as being ‘based
upon’ the ZX-14 motorcycles, useful articles not subject to copyright protection”).
115.
Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983).
116.
See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text; see infra notes 117-24 and
accompanying text.
117.
See R.C. Miall & John Tchalenko, A Painter’s Eye Movements: A Study of Eye and
Hand Movement During Portrait Drawing, 34 LEONARDO 35, 35 (2001).
118.
Id. at 38.
119.
Id.
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movement when drawing,”120 and his gaze on the face was less focused
and shorter in duration.121 Similarly, using sensors attached to the
artist’s hand and pencil, the study found that the trained artist
displayed a more stable, targeted, and even movement than the
haphazard movements of the untrained artist.122 Besides these
physiological differences among portrait sketch artists of different
abilities, the study also revealed the trained artist’s belief that his
own drawing was highly subjective: “I’m sure of what I am seeing, I’m
not quite sure what I am going to do about it. So I make a decision.
The final result is made up of a great many decisions.”123 Even more:
“I try to achieve a likeness. But what I want is a likeness to the
reaction I have to something I can see.”124 As the study demonstrates,
realistic depictions require skill, individual choices, and the personal
reaction and experience of the creator. These attributes reflect an
independent act of creation with a wide degree of subjective choices by
the artist, not rote copying.
2. Create a “Work”: Intellectual Production within Subject Matter of
Copyright
The second part of the originality test is an act of creating a
work that falls within copyrightable subject matter. The “create”
requirement focuses first on the actual process by which the creator
made the work in question; at this stage, the requirement is
subjective. The “create” requirement also looks at the end product—or
“work”—but only for the limited purpose of determining whether the
work falls within the realm of copyrightable subject matter, and not
some other discipline, such as patents, trademarks, or trade secrets. 125

120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 39.
124.
Id. (emphasis added). A study of digital imaging technology used to create printed
textile designs found a similar opportunity for the technology to facilitate the creative process.
See Cathy Treadaway, Digital Creativity: The Impact of Digital Imaging Technology on the
Creative Practice of Printed Textile and Surface Pattern Design, 4 J. TEXTILE & APPAREL, TECH.
& MGMT. 1 (2004). The level of creativity derived from the digital imaging depends in part “on
the intrinsic motivation of the practitioner and [her] psychological attitude to it.” Id. at 8.
125.
The analogy to draw is to patentable subject matter. Some things such as laws of
nature, natural phenomenon, and products of nature are not patentable subject matter. See 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). However, even patentable
subject matter such as an invention may not qualify for a patent if it does not satisfy novelty and
nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
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The “work” inquiry is objective and focuses on the end product of
whatever act of creation is involved.126
In this context, “to create” ties back to the constitutional notion
of being an “Author” of a “Writing” under the Copyright Clause.127 A
person who “creates” is one who has engaged in acts of authorship
resulting in a “Writing,” or at least something that falls within the
subject matter of copyright. As the Supreme Court has explained, an
author is “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker,”128
and authorship involves “intellectual production, . . . thought, and
conception.”129 The result of authorship should be a “Writing,” broadly
defined. Writings “are founded in the creative powers of the mind,”
and are “the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books,
prints, engravings, and the like.”130
“To create” a “work” thus adds a different element than the
independence (do not copy) requirement. A person can satisfy the
independence requirement, but fail the “to create” requirement. For
example, an independent discovery of the know-how related to a trade
secret, such as an innovative formula for a mechanical process, would
satisfy the “independently” requirement, but not the “create”
requirement. Creating know-how or a practical invention is not the
same as creating in the authorial sense. The creation must involve
something that falls within the subject matter of copyright (“embodied
in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like”).131 Likewise,
one could independently discover a fact or law of nature—satisfying
the independence requirement of originality—but still fail the second
requirement of creation of a work. As the Court recognized in Feist, a

126.
The “work” factor might also be included in the third part of test (i.e., modicum of
creativity) or as a part all by itself. However, this Article chooses not to include it in the third
part of the test, even though it shares some similarity to the objective inquiry under the third
part. The “modicum of creativity” analysis has its own developed case law. Combining the “work”
analysis with the third part might create unnecessary confusion with existing case law. Such a
concern is diminished with the second part (“create”), which has been discussed less in the cases.
For simplicity, this Article rejects a four-part test.
127.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
346-47 (1991).
128.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53, 58 (1884)).
129.
Id. at 347 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60).
130.
Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
131.
Id. (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94). Likewise, as Feist teaches,
independently compiling a database of facts does not necessarily involve creating a copyrightable
work. Id. A compiler can become an author by selecting and/or arranging the facts in a way that
is ultimately deemed to be sufficiently creative. Id. at 349. It goes beyond the scope of this Article
to discuss nontraditional types of creations that may present difficult questions of copyrightable
subject matter.
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discovery of a fact is not an act of creation by an author.132 Nor is the
creation of a word trademark, such as “Groupon,” no matter how
clever it is.133
Although one might consider the ultimate copyrightability of a
work under this prong, the better approach is to save that inquiry for
the third part of the test. Otherwise, the “create” requirement would
become redundant of the requirement of a modicum of creativity—a
proposition in no way embraced by Feist. Thus, so long as a creator
exercises some “intellectual production, . . . thought, [or] conception” to
make something in a format that falls within the subject matter of
copyright, the second requirement is met.134 For example, in Feist,
Rural Telephone Service satisfied the first two requirements because
it (1) independently (2) created a white pages phone directory, which
is a type of work within the subject matter of copyright.135 Rural,
however, failed the third requirement of making a work that had
sufficient creativity,136 as explained in the next section.
3. Modicum of Creativity
The third requirement—that the work possesses at least a
modicum of creativity—is an objective test that focuses not on the
process of creation, but on the end product created. In order to
determine whether this third requirement is met, one must examine
the putative work to see if it has some “creative spark, ‘no matter how
crude, humble, or obvious.’”137 As the Feist Court explained, “the
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice.”138 Thus, “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily.”139
However, “[t]here remains a narrow category of works in which
the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually

132.
Id. at 347 (“This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. . . .
[O]ne who discovers a fact is not its ‘maker’ or ‘originator.’” (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58)).
133.
See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2012) (short phrases are not copyrightable).
134.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60).
135.
Id. at 342; see id. at 358 (“Originality requires only that the author make the
selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from
another work), and that it display some minimal level of creativity.”); id. at 363 (“This
arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that Rural
undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself.”).
136.
Id. at 359.
137.
Id. at 345 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990)).
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
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nonexistent.”140 For example, compilations that are “so mechanical or
routine as to require no creativity whatsoever” fail the creativity
requirement.141 In Feist, an alphabetical listing of phone numbers
failed the test because “[i]t is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a
matter of course.”142
Though the Court’s explanation provides some guidance, the
Court stopped short of defining creativity or what constitutes a
“creative spark.” Feist’s analysis provides some clues as to what
works lack the “creative spark”: (1) works that are “so commonplace
that it has come to be expected as a matter of course” and (2) works
that are “so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity
whatsoever.”143 Only a few courts have found works that flunked this
low threshold.144
The Court set a standard that helps courts avoid making
difficult aesthetic judgments in the first place. Most works satisfy
originality; courts need not engage in searching review for originality.
In drawing the line between the vast majority of works that easily
satisfy creativity and the narrow class of works that do not, the Court
favorably cited Justice Holmes’s “aesthetic nondiscrimination”
principle—depicted above in Figure 2 as the Bleistein proviso—that
instructs judges to avoid evaluating the artistic merit of works except
for “the narrowest and most obvious limits.”145 If courts apply this
generous approach to the originality analysis, probing questions on
the level of creativity involved in a work are avoided unless the work
is of doubtful creativity.
B. Application of Three-Part Test
This Section applies the reconfigured three-part of originality
to some digital controversies in order to demonstrate how the test
sharpens the analysis. The analysis below shows that the more
automated digital creations are, the more problems raised under the
140.
Id. at 359.
141.
Id. at 362.
142.
Id. at 363.
143.
Id. at 362-63.
144.
These have occurred mainly in photography cases. For example, lower courts have
held that slavish photographic copies of works in the public domain lack sufficient creativity. See
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
145.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 359 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903)); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-83 (1994) (citing
Bleistein and discussing test for determining parody is “whether a parodic character may
reasonably be perceived”).
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first and second parts of the test. Digital creations are likely to pass
easily the test of embodying a minimal degree of creativity, but they
may face stumbling blocks in “independently” “creating a work.”
1. Revisiting Meshwerks
Under the reconfigured test of originality, the outcome of
Meshwerks would be different. In short, the digital wire frames
created by Meshwerks depicting a Toyota car in 3D fashion had
sufficient originality because they were (1) not copied from other
works, (2) but, instead, were the result of Meshwerks’s intellectual
production and were embodied in a work that (3) had at least a
modicum of creativity. Although Meshwerks should receive only a
thin copyright for its particular rendition protecting against only
slavish copying of Meshwerks’s depiction (others may draw their own
renditions of the Toyota car, which itself is not copyrightable),
Meshwerks’s wire-frame depiction had sufficient originality.
a. Independently
The first question is whether Meshwerks made something
independently as opposed to copying it from other works. The Tenth
Circuit held that Meshwerks’s wire-frame depictions of the car were
not independent creations, but instead, were “(very good) copies of
Toyota’s vehicles.”146 The court based this reasoning on the mistaken
premise that realistic depictions of things in the world are somehow
impermissible “copies” under Feist.147
But, as Justice Holmes
admonished, one can always “copy” what exists in real life and still
receive copyright protection; one simply cannot copy someone else’s
copy (meaning someone else’s work).148 What the Tenth Circuit failed
to apprehend is that Toyota’s vehicles, as useful articles, are not
copyrightable works.149 An author can freely depict a Toyota car just
as he can depict Mt. Kilimanjaro or a motorcycle. All three are
uncopyrightable subject matter. A person who sketches the car,
mountain, or motorcycle easily satisfies the requirement of
independence.150

146.
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir.
2008).
147.
See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
148.
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; see also Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305
(7th Cir. 1983) (discussing importance of Bleistein approach).
149.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
150.
To the extent that some of Toyota’s car designs were protected by design patents,
Toyota authorized Meshwerks to make the digital models of the cars, so Toyota probably had no
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b. Create a Work
The next question is whether Meshwerks exercised intellectual
production, thought, or conception to create something in a format
within the subject matter of copyright. This requirement is also met.
First, the digital wire-frame depictions of the Toyota car undoubtedly
fall within the subject matter of copyright as pictorial or graphic
works.151
The only question, then, is whether individuals at
Meshwerks exercised enough human thought in the process of
creation for the law to consider them to be the originators or creators
of the content.
Had a computer program created entirely the wire frames of
the Toyota car, the models arguably would not meet the second
requirement of originality.152 However, in this case, Meshwerks
employees spent eighty to one hundred hours per car manually
fine-tuning, correcting, and adding further details (including door
handles, headlights, and wheels) to the initial computer-generated
model to “sculpt” the model into something more realistic—a
two-dimensional graphic that looked three-dimensional.153 Even the
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that Meshwerks exercised significant
human thought in creating the wire-frame model of the Toyota car:
“we do not for a moment seek to downplay the considerable amount of
time, effort, and skill that went into making Meshwerks’ digital wireframe models.”154 If simply pressing a button to snap a photograph is
a sufficient act of authorship or creation,155 then it is hard to imagine
that spending over eighty hours digitally modeling a realistic
wire-frame depiction of a car—an exercise of skill probably few,
untrained lay people could demonstrate—is not a sufficient act of
authorship or creation. The key is not the time or labor involved, but
rather the artistic thought required to conceptualize and depict
something two dimensional to appear three dimensional—and in
realistic fashion.156

claim that Meshwerks infringed Toyota’s design patents. See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266
(discussing Toyota’s design patents).
151.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works).
152.
Cf. Lucky Break Wishbone Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 373 F. App’x 752, 754-55
(9th Cir. 2010) (finding originality in 3D plastic wishbone based on scanned dimensions of actual
wishbone and other additions made by human input).
153.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260-61.
154.
Id. at 1268.
155.
See Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 148
(7th Cir. 1985) (“A photograph may be copyrighted, although it is the work of an instant and its
significance may be accidental.”).
156.
See supra notes 68-81, 111-24 and accompanying text.
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c. Modicum of Creativity
The final question is whether the digital wire-frame models of
the Toyota car have a minimal level of creativity. The Tenth Circuit
did not make a judgment on this factor, but parts of its opinion
suggest that the court doubted this factor was met.157 Analogizing a
digital wire frame to a photograph, the court reasoned that the
“unadorned” Toyota wire frame must be “filtered out” of the originality
analysis just as a bottle in a photograph of the bottle supposedly
would:
And, by analogy . . . we hold that the unadorned images of Toyota’s vehicles cannot be
copyrighted by Meshwerks and likewise must be filtered out. To the extent that
Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models depict only those unadorned vehicles, having
stripped away all lighting, angle, perspective, and “other ingredients” associated with an
original expression, we conclude that they have left no copyrightable matter.158

The Tenth Circuit’s “filtering” out of the unadorned Toyota car
from the creativity analysis was erroneous. First of all, the Skyy cases
on which the Tenth Circuit relied did not undertake any such
“filtering” analysis for determining the threshold question of
originality. Instead, to the extent any filtering of unprotected
elements occurred, it occurred in the infringement analysis only after
applying a liberal test of originality to find that the photograph met
the test.159
More fundamentally, unlike a photograph of a bottle,
Meshwerks’s digital wire-frame model of the car does not depict an
actual wire-frame car that exists in real life—Toyota’s cars do not
have wire frames in their construction or assembly. In this sense,
Meshwerks’s wire-frame car depiction is a fictitious or imagined
representation of the car.160 The three-dimensional wire frames are,
in other words, fictitious incremental additions by Meshwerks to the
Toyota car design. Such imagined representations—which exist
nowhere in the actual car and which Meshwerks sculpted manually on
the computer—should easily pass the test of creativity.
Granted, some imaginary representations of objects in the
world may be too crude to pass the low threshold. A simple stick
157.
See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265.
158.
Id. at 1266.
159.
See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. (Skyy II), 323 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2003);
Skyy I, 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000).
160.
See Subotnik, supra note 27, at 1517. The Meshwerks court’s emphasis on the
“unadorned” nature of the wire-frame digital model of the car masked the creativity involved in
depicting wire frames that do not exist in the actual car. See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265. For
example, imagine someone created a 3D wire frame of a nude human body. Even though the wire
frame of the human body was “unadorned,” arguably the rendering of the 3D wire frame of the
nude human body would possess some “creative spark.”
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figure of a human being might be so crude or common to fail the low
threshold of creativity.161 However, nowhere in the opinion did the
Tenth Circuit suggest the wire-frame models were like stick figures.
Meshwerks’s model of the car (shown above in Figure 1) had
considerable detail to make the realistic appearance of
three-dimensional shape, contours, and depth of the car on a
two-dimensional screen. Meshwerks chose to position the wire-frame
car against no background, at different angles to which the car can be
rotated, with wire frames transversing the car’s contours, plus black
or gray lines, making the car, in effect, see-through in places. These
detailed features, parts of which are purely imaginary, show some
“creative spark, no matter how crude.”162 That the parties intended to
have Meshwerks create a digital car model that could serve as the
basis for Toyota to modify and use in commercial advertisements does
not disqualify Meshwerks’s digital depiction of its creativity.163
Finally, as discussed above, the court based its analysis on the
false premise that the elements of photography that make photos
original—such as lighting and staging—are the same for digital
modeling. They are not. Digital modeling in realistic fashion may
involve far more human input than snapping a photo. Moreover, the
photograph cases the court relied on—Skyy I and II—reaffirmed the
approach of the majority of courts that “no photograph, however
simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author”164
and, therefore, “almost any[ ] photograph may claim the necessary
originality to support a copyright merely by virtue of the
photographers’ [sic] personal choice of subject matter, angle of
photograph, lighting, and determination of the precise time when the
photograph is to be taken.”165 Under the prevailing approach to
photography, Meshwerks’s model should easily pass the test of
creativity.
161.
See Dean D. Niro, Protecting Characters Through Copyright Law: Paving a New
Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, and Motion Picture Characters Can All Travel, 41 DEPAUL
L. REV. 359, 374-75 (1992).
162.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990)).
163.
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (concluding
circus pictures used for commercial advertisements were not disqualified from copyright); James
Elkins, Art History and the Criticism of Computer-Generated Images, 27 LEONARDO 335, 336
(1994) (“[I]f we look away on account of the unpleasant glare of technological references, we risk
missing the development of new meanings—and most importantly, we tend to assume that the
technology is contributing something superficial—such as efficiency—when it may also be
bending artistic purposes in new directions.”).
164.
See Skyy I, 225 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone
Publ’g Co. 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
165.
See id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2.08(E)(1) (1990)).
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2. 3D Printers
The proposed test of originality will better enable courts to
evaluate the potential originality of creations by new technologies,
such as 3D printers. Some creations from 3D printers will have no
trouble passing the test of originality, while others may face
difficulties.
a. Independently
Creations produced by 3D printers can satisfy the
independence requirement if the designs of the objects utilized by 3D
printers are not copied from someone else’s work. For example, if a
person created a computer-aided design (CAD) of a toy train from
scratch, and not copied from elsewhere, the design would satisfy the
independence requirement. Both the computer design (a pictorial
work) and the 3D toy train produced (a sculptural work) receive
copyright protection, provided that they satisfy the other two
requirements of originality. On the other hand, if a person simply
downloaded someone else’s CAD of the toy train from the Internet, the
copied design and 3D toy train produced would flunk the
independence requirement. The person would not have independently
created the CAD and toy; instead, he merely copied the designs.
A more difficult question arises if the design of the work or
CAD is in the public domain (meaning not protected by copyright166),
but still allows some user customization of the object printed, such as
color, shape, and size. Imagine that the CAD software allows the user
to manipulate a public domain CAD for a toy train by selecting
different colors, shapes, and sizes for the train. What if the user
picked the color and size for the train, but the software did everything
else? Would that be enough of an incremental addition to the public
domain CAD for the addition to be “independent,” and not just copied?
These additions are probably not enough to satisfy the
independence requirement. Copyright law allows people to copyright
their incremental additions to public domain works if those additions
satisfy originality. Courts have required “more than merely [a]
trivial” variation from the public domain work.167 Otherwise, the
subsequent work is nothing more than a copy of the public domain
work, which is free for all to copy.168 For example, in the famous case
166.
See generally Brown v. Latin Am. Music Co., 498 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2007)
(describing public domain).
167.
See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1978).
168.
See id. at 452 n.5 (“We emphasize that compilations or new arrangements of
material which represent merely trivial additions to or omissions from a preexisting map will not
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Batlin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
new plastic version of the classic Uncle Sam bank, already in the
public domain, lacked originality because the plastic bank was
“‘extremely similar to the cast iron bank, save in size and material’
with the only other differences, such as the shape of the satchel and
the leaves in the eagle’s talons being ‘by all appearances, minor.’”169
Accordingly, the plastic bank was “practically an exact copy” of the
Uncle Sam bank in the public domain.170
The hypothetical toy train based on a public domain CAD
would face similar problems. Copyright law would likely consider
changes to the color and size to be merely trivial variations from the
public domain design and, therefore would consider the resulting toy
trains to be mere copies of the public domain design.171 If the user of
the CAD software made greater changes to the public domain train,
such as adding new features or styling to the body of the train, the
user would have a better chance of satisfying the independence
requirement.
b. Create a Work
Creating one’s own CAD of a toy train from scratch would
easily satisfy the “create” requirement. Creating the design from
scratch
manifests
intellectual
conception,
thought,
and
production—all “founded in the creative powers of the mind.”172 The
toy train is a type of work that falls within the subject matter of
copyright. By contrast, if a user simply downloaded someone else’s
CAD of the toy train and pressed “print” on the 3D printer, she would
not satisfy the second requirement. The toy train did not originate
from the user’s mental creation. Likewise, in the cases involving
public domain CADs that allow customization, a user may have a
harder time satisfying the second requirement if the choices of
customization—such as color, size, and shape—are modest, resulting

support a copyright absent some additional original work. For example, copying the outline of
the United States and the boundaries of each state cannot be said to involve any element of
original choice or arrangement.” (citation omitted)).
169.
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
170.
Id.
171.
Cf. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Additions to the preexisting
maps such as color, shading, and labels using standard fonts and shapes fall within the narrow
category of works that lack even a minimum level of creativity . . . .”); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2006)
(discussing Copyright Office approach to coloring). But cf. Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc.,
159 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing use of various colors in map as a part of overall
creative arrangement).
172.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
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in only trivial variations from the public domain designs. Thus, in
many cases, the first two requirements—independent and create—will
likely track each other.
However, in some cases, the putative work may satisfy the
independence requirement, but fail the “create” requirement. For
example, the objects printed by the 3D printer may be useful
articles—such as a can opener or hammer—that do not fall within the
subject matter of copyright.
Even though the objects may be
independently produced and not copied, they fail the “create”
requirement of embodying a format that falls within copyrightable
subject matter.
c. Modicum of Creativity
For many works created on a 3D printer, the third requirement
will be easy to satisfy. The court must examine the object produced by
the 3D printer to see if it has the “creative spark” and is not so
mechanical “to be expected as a matter of course.”173 Moreover, under
the Bleistein proviso, courts are to avoid judging the artistic worth of
various works “outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”174
Under this lenient approach, a CAD of a toy train made from
scratch, even if “crude, humble, or obvious,” would likely satisfy the
minimal level of creativity. However, if a user simply downloaded
someone else’s CAD of a toy train and pressed “print” on the 3D
printer, there is no creativity on the part of the user. The user has
added nothing to the CAD.175 Likewise, if a user copied a public
domain CAD of a toy train and changed only the color, size, and shape,
the user’s additions may face a difficult time satisfying even the low
threshold of creativity.
3. Siri on iPhone
Siri on the iPhone presents even more perplexing questions for
originality. The three-part test of originality illuminates the key
issues. As explained below, one of the most perplexing issues will
arise if Siri itself creates answers on its own through artificial
intelligence: To what extent are Siri’s answers the original expression
of an author?
173.
Id. at 363.
174.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
175.
As shown by this example, the parts of the originality test sometimes overlap. By
definition, a mere copy cannot be the result of the copier’s independent creation, or possess a
modicum of creativity added by the copier. However, each part of the test has a slightly different
function that surfaces, especially in more difficult cases.
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a. Independently
Whether Siri satisfies the first requirement of independence
will depend on the source for Siri’s answers. To the extent Siri’s
answers are not copied from outside sources, the answers will meet
the independence requirement.
Imagine that Siri provides the following answers, at different
times, to the question, “What is the meaning of life?”
(1) “Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get
some walking in, and try to live together in peace and harmony with people of all creeds
and nations.” (created by Siri programmer);
(2) “42.” (quoted from other source by Siri programmer); and
(3) “I don’t know. But I think there’s an app for that.” (created by artificial
intelligence).176

For the purposes of this discussion, imagine that the first
answer was created by a Siri programmer and programmed into the
software for Siri’s response, the second answer was a quote from the
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy programmed into Siri’s software, and
third answer was created by the artificial intelligence of Siri itself.
In terms of the independence requirement, the second answer
presents the easiest scenario. Because the answer is simply a
verbatim quote, it was not independently produced. It therefore fails
the first part of the originality test. By contrast, the first and third
answers were not copied from other sources.
The first was
independently produced by Siri’s programmer, while the third was
independently produced by Siri, the artificial intelligence. Both
satisfy the independent requirement. The third answer presents an
interesting question of “authorship,” which is better addressed under
the second requirement.
b. Create a Work
Whether Siri’s answers satisfy the second requirement will
again depend on the source of Siri’s answers. An answer copied from
an outside source, such as the second answer above, will not satisfy
the “create” requirement. But if Siri’s programmers created the
answers (e.g., the first answer above) or if Siri itself created the
answers (e.g., the third answer above), these answers may satisfy the
“create” requirement.

176.
The answers in the hypothetical are ones that Siri actually provides. However, this
hypothetical imagines that one of the answers Siri itself created through artificial intelligence
(instead of being pre-programmed), even though Siri is probably not (yet) sophisticated enough to
generate answers on its own.
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Some human conception and production of expression are
required for a person to write the following answer: “Try and be nice to
people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get
some walking in, and try to live together in peace and harmony with
people of all creeds and nations.” Such expression—fixed somewhere
in Siri’s database or memory and also viewable on the iPhone screen
and narrated in audio—falls within copyrightable subject matter, at
least as a literary work.177
The more difficult question is whether Siri’s artificial
intelligence-generated answer satisfies the “create” requirement.
Scholars have long debated the problem of authorship presented by AI
and computer-generated works.178 Some favor allowing copyrights
and treating the programmer, the AI, and/or the user as the author.179
Others take the contrary view.180 This Article does not take a final
position in this ongoing debate over AI generated works.181 For this
Article’s purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that the second part of
the originality test raises a fundamental question of whether

177.
The textual component of Siri’s answer would qualify as a literary work. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“‘Literary works’ are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or
cards, in which they are embodied.”).
178.
See, e.g., Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments:
Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649,
660-73 (2006); Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial
Intelligence, 4 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 707, 744-46 (1982); Evan H. Farr, Copyrightability of
Computer-Created Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 63, 79-80 (1989); Karl F. Milde,
Jr., Can a Computer be An “Author” or an “Inventor”?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378, 401-04 (1969);
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1036-37
(1993); Susan H. Nycum & Ivan K. Fong, Artificial Intelligence and Certain Resulting Legal
Issues, 1985 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 6; Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986); Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games
to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly
Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 173-74 (1997).
179.
See, e.g., Butler, supra note 178, at 744-46 (various entities determined by
imaginary author); Farr, supra note 178, at 79-80 (programmer); Milde, supra note 178, at
401-04 (AI); Miller, supra note 178, at 1056-57 (possible allocation of copyright among different
people); Nycum & Fong, supra note 178, at 1, 6 (AI software copyright owner and user);
Samuelson, supra note 178, at 1192 (user); Wu, supra note 178, at 173-74 (possible allocation
among programmer, user, and AI if it can be incentivized); Saif M. Khan, Creativity by Artificial
Intelligence: Who Gets the Copyright? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (possible
allocation to user, programmer acting as user, and possibly to AI if they can be incentivized or
pass Turing test).
180.
See Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675 (1997).
181.
This author’s preliminary view is against recognizing AI created works as original
works of authorship and leaving those works unprotected by copyright.
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copyright’s scope should include nonhuman creators that create
practically all of the expression.
c. Modicum of Creativity
Siri’s first and third answers above are creative enough to pass
the modicum of creativity test. One might question whether the third
answer, consisting of only ten words, is long enough to satisfy the
creativity requirement.182 However, it is more than just a short
phrase and perhaps the law should consider it within the
question-and-answer context, which together can constitute a joint
work.183 Even if evaluating Siri’s answer alone, recent cases have
recognized that short sentences (even haiku) can be copyrightable.184
By contrast, the second answer, a mere copied quote, fails the
creativity test.
C. Advantages of the Three-Part Test of Originality
As demonstrated by the previous discussion, reconfiguring the
test of originality to a three-part test helps to understand better the
elements required for originality. Delineating precisely what each
element requires helps courts avoid confusion over or conflation of the
various elements of originality, as was evident in the Meshwerks
case.185 Although the three-part test is not a mathematical formula
that mechanically determines whether a work is original, the test
adds greater precision to the analysis. In difficult cases, such as those
raised by AI and 3D printing, the three-part test helps to identify the
proper questions that courts must answer under the respective parts
of the test.
182.
Cf. CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519-20 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding short phrases are not copyrightable).
183.
See Andrea S. Hirsch, Comment, Copyrighting Conversations: Applying the 1976
Copyright Act to Interviews, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 1071, 1081-82 (1982). Whether the Q&A satisfies
fixation of a work is an interesting question. The Q&A on Siri appears in text and audio form on
the iPhone 4S at least long enough for the person to read it. That may be enough for fixation
under current law. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir.
1993) (discussing fixation of a copy of a program in temporary RAM).
184.
See Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626, 635
(8th Cir. 1989) (finding originality in “test statements [that] are short, simple, declarative
sentences, but they are not merely fragmentary words and phrases within the meaning of 37
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)”); Stern v. Does, No. CV-09-01986-DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (“[T]he copyrightability of a very short textual work—be it word, phrase,
sentence, or stanza—depends on the presence of creativity.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No.
95-CV-1107-A,1996 WL 633131, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (suggesting haiku is copyrightable);
see also Stephanie T. North, Note, Twitteright: Finding Protection in 140 Characters or Less, 11
J. HIGH TECH. L. 333 (2011) (analyzing possible originality in tweets).
185.
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
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III. RESPONDING TO CONCERNS
This Part addresses concerns to the proposed three-part test of
digital originality and shows why the test is, on a balance, an
improvement over the current approach.
A. Complicating Originality
Some may object to the proposed test as needlessly
complicating the doctrine of originality. Critics may contend that the
three-part test yields very little additional insight beyond the two-part
test that already applies and that a special test that applies only to
digital creations may create unnecessary confusion for courts. For
example, should digital photographs now be analyzed under the
three-part test?
The criticism of complexity has some validity. Switching to a
three-part test does add a measure of complexity to the analysis
beyond the current two-part test. Yet the added complexity is justified
if it yields more reasoned and informed results in complex cases.
Breaking down the Feist test into three elements emphasizes the
distinct contributions each part of the test provides to the analysis.
As Figure 3 depicts below, the different parts of the test
perform different roles. In some cases, a work may satisfy the
independence and creativity requirements, but not the second
requirement of creating a work (for example, functional know-how or
useful articles independently created, or, arguably, a work created
solely by artificial intelligence). Likewise, in other cases, a work may
satisfy the independence and “create” requirements, but not the
modicum of creativity requirement (for example, the white pages
phone directory in Feist).
As explained above, Meshwerks’s
wire-frame depictions of the car satisfy each part of the test of
originality, whereas a mere copy of someone else’s work will fail each
part.186 Understanding what each part of originality is testing will
help courts avoid committing the same mistake as the Tenth Circuit
did in Meshwerks.

186.

See supra notes 146-82 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3. Analysis Under Three-Part Test of Originality
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Moreover, the concern about creating two different tests of
originality is misplaced. There is only one test of originality. Both
formulations of the test (two-part and three-part) derive directly from
Feist.187 Many run-of-the-mill copyright cases may not require an
extended analysis of originality because the works in question easily
pass the test, however formulated. The proposed test does not require
more work for courts or the Copyright Office with respect to these easy
cases. Instead, the three-part test provides greater guidance on
originality especially for those difficult cases or cases of first
impression presented by new digital technologies.
B. Backsliding to Photography or Non-Digital Works
Related to the first concern, some may object to the proposed
test as possibly raising the bar of originality for works that courts
have long since deemed sufficient to pass the low threshold.
Photography is one example—should digital photographs be analyzed
under the three-part test of digital originality? And, if so, then under
the reconfigured test, some photographs taken simply by a person
pressing a button—with today’s sophisticated automatic cameras
doing pretty much everything else—may not contain enough
“intellectual production, . . . thought, [or] conception.”188 In other
words, the law may view merely pressing a button on a camera as
akin to pressing a button on a 3D printer. Neither involves enough
creative thought for authorship, one might conclude.

187.
188.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Id. at 347.
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Other scholars have debated more extensively whether courts
should subject photographs to greater scrutiny for originality.189 The
Supreme Court left the door open to that possibility in
Burrow-Giles,190 although most lower courts have rejected the
possibility and applied a very low threshold to photographs.191 It goes
beyond the scope of this Article to revisit that debate. On one hand,
principles of stare decisis may militate in favor of retaining the
prevailing approach to photographs, as may other prudential reasons
such as those articulated by Professor Subotnik.192 On the other hand,
reexamination of the photography case law may be helpful in better
understanding what purposes originality should serve. This Article’s
proposal is compatible with either approach.
The same response applies to fears that the three-part test may
eventually creep back to cases involving nondigital works and make it
more difficult for them to satisfy originality. The proposal gives courts
the option to limit the proposed test to new types of digital creations
that raise issues of first impression. The proposal provides courts
guidance to handle these novel issues, rather than requiring courts to
revisit old cases or well-known types of works.
C. Defending Meshwerks
Finally, some may disagree with this Article’s criticism of
Meshwerks and argue that the Tenth Circuit correctly decided the
case. Some may contend that the Toyota car design is copyrightable
because it “can be identified separately from” the useful article of the
car itself,193 or that, in any event, copyright law should consider
realistic depictions of uncopyrightable subject matter “copying” for the
purposes of originality. For the reasons explained above, both
arguments run counter to existing case law.194 But, even assuming
the possibility for disagreement, such disagreement justifies even
further the need for reexamining the elements of the Feist test to drill

189.
See Subotnik, supra note 27, at 1528-29.
190.
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (questioning
whether “ordinary production” of a photograph satisfies originality if “[i]t is simply the manual
operation, by the use of these instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the
visible representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this representation being its
highest merit”).
191.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
192.
See Subotnik, supra note 27, at 1528-29 (“[H]eightening the originality bar might
distort artistic production or increase judicial tastemaking . . . ”).
193.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work”); see also
supra note 53.
194.
See supra notes 53, 56, 85, 110-15, and accompanying text.
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elements have remained opaque.
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For far too long, these

IV. CONCLUSION
For new types of digital creations, courts should reconfigure
the test of originality into a three-part test, asking whether the work
in question (1) was independently produced, (2) in a way that required
the creative powers of the mind and resulted in a creation that falls
within the subject matter of copyright, and (3) possesses a modicum of
creativity. This test offers a more precise way to analyze whether
originality exists in digital creations, especially in cases of first
impression involving new technologies.

